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ABSTRACT 
For chemical engineering dynamic systems, there is an increasing demand for 
better process performance, high product quality, absolute reliability & safety, maximum 
cost efficiency and less environmental impact. Improved individual process components 
and advanced automatic control techniques have brought significant benefits to the 
chemical industry. However, fault-free operation of processes can not be guaranteed. 
Timely fault diagnosis and proper management can help to avoid or at least minimize the 
undesirable consequences. 
There are many techniques for fault diagnosis, and observer-based methods have 
been widely studied and have proved to be efficient for fault diagnosis. The basic idea of 
an observer-based approach is to generate a specific residual signal which carries the 
information of specific faults, as well as the information of process disturbances, model 
uncertainties, other faults and measurement noises. For fault diagnosis, the residual 
should be sensitive to faults and insensitive to other unknown inputs. With this feature, 
faults can be easily detected and may be isolated and identified. 
This thesis applied an observer-based fault diagnosis method to three exothermic 
CSTR case studies. In order to improve the operational safety of exothermic CSTRs with 
risks of runaway reactions and explosion, fault diagnostic observers are built for fault 
detection, isolation and identification.  For this purpose, different types of most common 
faults have been studied in different reaction systems. For each fault, a specific observer 
and the corresponding residual is built, which works as an indicator of that fault and is 
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robust to other unknown inputs. For designing linear observers, the original nonlinear 
system is linearized at steady state, and the observer is designed based on the linearized 
system. However, in the simulations, the observer is tested on the nonlinear system 
instead of the linearized system. In addition, an efficient & effective general MATLAB 
program has been developed for fault diagnosis observer design. Extensive simulation 
studies have been performed to test the fault diagnostic observer on exothermic CSTRs. 
The results show that the proposed fault diagnosis scheme can be directly implemented 
and it works well for diagnosing faults in exothermic chemical reactors.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
CA Concentration of A component in the reactor 
T Temperature of the mixture in the reactor 
Tw Temperature of the coolant 
F Feed flow rate 
V Volume of the reactor 
CAin Inlet feed concentration 
Tin Inlet feed temperature 
VW Volume of the cooling jacket 
Twin Inlet coolant temperature 
FW Inlet coolant flow rate 
Cp Heat capacity of the reacting mixture 
Cpw Heat capacity of the coolant 
ρ Density of the reacting mixture 
ρw Density of the reacting coolant 
U Overall heat transfer coefficient 
E Activation energy 
∆E Uncertainty in the activation energy 
∆U Uncertainty in the overall heat transfer coefficient 
f Fault 
d Disturbance 
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A Overall heat transfer area 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation 
1.1.1 Why Fault Diagnosis? 
For chemical dynamic systems, there is an increasing demand for better process 
performance, high product quality, absolute reliability & safety, maximum cost 
efficiency and less environmental impact. There are many ways to achieve these objects. 
Traditionally, industry struggles to improve individual process components, including 
plant equipment, controllers, sensors and actuators. Improvement of individual 
components can somehow lower the risk of faults. However, fault-free processes cannot 
be guaranteed during operation. Minor equipment damage as well as sensor & actuator 
malfunction may result in unexpected events. Even if the hardware equipment have no 
problems during operation, process abnormalities, due to complexity of chemical 
process, still have risks to cause faults.  
When faults occur, the operating points will always go away from desired points. 
Small deviation may affect product quality, and large deviation may cause unplanned 
shut down, which increases the operating cost. Larger deviation without timely detection 
and management will inevitably result in safety issues, and even human casualties and 
environmental problems.  
Timely diagnosis (including detection, isolation and identification) of faults and 
proper management (including timely maintenance, necessary switch off some processes 
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and reconfiguration of controllers) can help to avoid or at least minimize the undesirable 
consequences. Thus fault diagnosis is very important for chemical processes.  
1.1.2 Why Observer Based Methods? 
For fault diagnosis, there are two schemes: hardware redundancy based method 
and analytical redundancy based method. Hardware redundancy is a traditional method, 
using the identical (redundant) hardware components parallel to process components. If 
an output of a process component differs from the output of its identical component, the 
fault can be detected. The obvious advantages of this method are its direct fault isolation 
and high reliability. But the disadvantages are also apparent: this scheme can only be 
applied on some components with outputs or sensors. Also, some expensive components 
with hardware redundancies or some equipment with limited space require higher 
technology and cost. 
The other scheme is the analytical redundancy, replacing the hardware 
redundancy by a mathematical model. Many digital computers can simulate 
mathematical models and estimate the outputs. The difference between measured 
variables and estimated output can help for fault diagnosis. Currently, there are three 
main analytical redundancy based methods: observer-based method, parity-space based 
method and parameter-identification based method. Observer-based method is easy to be 
used for online implementation and for quick detection. Also, observer based method is 
more flexible, because parity-space and parameter identification based method are 
special forms of observer based method. 
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1.1.3 Why for Linear Systems? 
Linear system is relatively simple and easier to study. Many systems can be 
replaced by reasonable linear models, which have the characteristics of processes. If the 
operating region is not too wide and the linearization error is not too large, linearized 
model is a good option. 
1.2 Objectives 
Just like the sensors, if we can build soft sensors which not only indicate the 
existence of faults, but also the location and size of the faults, fault diagnosis is 
completely realized. Previously, state observers have been used to estimate the state 
variables. Comparing the difference, called residual, between estimated states and 
measurements, we can somehow notice the faults and disturbances in the system. With 
disturbances and faults, the residuals are always nonzero. But we are more interested in 
the faults instead of disturbances. If we can build residuals which are only affected by 
faults, the residuals will work as indicators of faults. When faults occur, the residuals are 
nonzero. Without faults, the residuals stay at zero. Thus the main objective of this thesis 
is to design special observers which get the disturbances decoupled from the residuals. 
The residuals work as soft sensors of faults. Then apply this method to chemical 
processes. Even though this method has been studied for two decades and has wide 
applications in electrical and aerospace engineering, it has had limited application in 
chemical engineering. The objective of this thesis is to present unknown input diagnostic 
observer technique and apply this method to chemical processes.  
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If effective fault diagnosis can be achieved, the fault indicators can be connected 
to the alarms system. It will be very convenient and efficient for chemical engineers to 
diagnose faults at an early stage in the chemical plant. Also, the signals of fault soft 
sensors can be transferred to the Distributed Control Systems (DCS) or Programmable 
Logic Controller (PLC). With the information of faults, DCS or PLC will correct the 
measurements and controllers’ output. In this way, chemical plant safety can be 
improved.  
1.3 Thesis Outline and Contributions 
The following overview briefly describes its major contributions and presents an 
outline of this dissertation.  
Chapter 2: Review of fault diagnosis techniques – introduces the basic concepts 
used in fault diagnosis and presents an overview of fault diagnosis methods. Basic 
concepts include types of faults, fault detection, fault isolation and fault identification. 
Different fault diagnosis methods have been reviewed.  
Chapter 3: Unknown input diagnosis observer (UIDO) design - reviews 
Luenberger functional observer, unknown input observer (UIO) and unknown input 
diagnostic observer. Detailed derivation of UIDO is presented in this chapter. The design 
procedure is summarized and a MATLAB program is also developed.  
Chapter 4: Application to exothermic CSTRs – presents the application of UIDO 
method to three representative exothermic CSTR systems. The first one is a CSTR 
consisting of two possible faults in two different sensors. The second CSTR has one 
possible fault in the heat exchanger and the other possible fault in the reactor 
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temperature sensor. The third CSTR considers two possible faults in an analytical sensor 
and heat exchanger, and one disturbance in reaction activation energy. These three cases 
consider different reaction systems.  
Chapter 5: Conclusions and future directions - presents a summary of this thesis, 
discusses the conclusions of the applications and gives several possible future directions. 
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2. REVIEW OF FAULT DIAGNOSIS TECHNIQUES 
 
2.1 Basic Concepts 
2.1.1 Types of Faults 
Location-based Categories 
Sensor Faults 
Sensor faults: In the broadest definition, a sensor is an object whose purpose is to 
detect events or changes in its environment, and then provide a corresponding output. In 
Process Control, information is gathered automatically from various sensors or other 
devices in the plant. This information is used to control different types of equipment and 
thereby to control operation of the plant. These sensors detect temperatures, pressures, 
fluid flow rates and levels, etc. [2].  
Therefore, a sensor fault may degrade performance of decision-making systems, 
including feedback control system, safety control system, quality control system, state 
estimation system, optimization system[3]. For instance, in a CSTR system, the 
temperature and pressure sensors are used to measure the temperature and pressure of 
the reactor, and transfer the measured signal to the feedback control system. In closed 
loop control system, the outputs from sensors are used as the input of the controllers to 
maintain the operating points within a desired range. The presence of sensor faults 
would affect the decision making of the feedback controller. Any fault in sensors may 
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cause the operating points deviating from the set points. If the deviation is out of desired 
range, several issues may occur, including product quality and safety, etc.  
There are five major sensor categories of collecting various types of variables in 
industrial [4]. 
1. Physical parameter sensors: temperature, pressure, density, weight, etc.;  
2. Spatial parameter sensors: state, position, level, depth, interface, etc.;  
3. Sensors for detecting abnormal phenomena: flame, smoke, ATEX-rated 
atmosphere, hazardous gaseous/liquid/solid substances, video-monitoring, etc.;  
4. Kinematic parameter sensors: flow rate, velocity, acceleration, vibration, 
rotation, mechanical stress, etc.;  
5. Physicochemical parameter sensors: pH, rH, conductivity, resistivity, 
radioactivity, intensity, voltage, metal content, etc. 
The first three categories are involved in over 90% of the accidents. Thus it is 
important to detect sensor faults. 
Common sensor faults/failures include: (a) bias; (b) drift; (c) performance 
degradation (or loss of accuracy); (d) sensor freezing; and (e) calibration error [3]. 
Figure 2.1 depicts common types of sensor faults. 
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Fig. 2.1 Common types of sensor faults 
 
The mathematical representation of the sensor faults [5]: 
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Actuator Faults 
An actuator is a type of motor that is responsible for moving or controlling a 
mechanism or system. It is operated by a source of energy, typically electric 
current, hydraulic fluid pressure, or pneumatic pressure, and converts that energy into 
motion [6]. For process control system, actuators are necessary to transform output of 
controllers (or control signal) into motion to control processes. A fault in actuator may 
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cause loss of control. Actuator faults include, for example, stuck-up of control valves 
and faults in pumps, etc. Several common faults in servomotors include Lock-in-Place 
(LIP), Float, Hard-over Failure (HOF) and Loss of Effectiveness (LOE). In the case of 
LIP case, the actuator “freezes” at a particular condition and will not respond to 
subsequent commands. In the case of HOF, the actuator moves to the lower or upper 
position limit independent of subsequent commands. When float failure occurs, the 
actuator output stick to zero and will not respond to the commands. Loss of effectiveness 
is characterized by lowering the actuator’s gain respecting to its nominal value [3, 7]. 
Figure 2.2 depicts common types of actuator faults. 
 
Fig. 2.2 Common types of actuator faults 
 
Different types of actuator faults can be mathematically represented by: 
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Component Faults 
These faults occur in the equipment of plant. When component faults occur, the 
physical parameters of that component change, and then the plant dynamics may change. 
The main reason for equipment faults is wear and tear. Sometimes the leakage in the 
tank or pipeline, or the fouling in the heat exchanger may cause serious consequences 
and immeasurable loss. Thus it is important to detect equipment faults during process 
[1].   
Heat exchangers and heat exchanger networks are frequently used for cooling 
and recovering heat for safety concerns and energy requirements. For a fiercely 
exothermic-reaction reactor, the heat exchanger is necessary to cool down the 
temperature in case of runaway reactions. Also in the oil refining plant, the amount of 
energy used is enormous. Thus it is important to know the performance of heat 
exchangers. The well-known problem of heat exchangers is the fouling, which affects 
heat transfer, and the temperature of products, and then safety issues and energy waste 
occur. Thus production engineers need monitoring methods to answer practical questions 
including: What’s the actual performance of the particular heat exchanger at particular 
time? Which moment is ideal or necessary to shut down the process and maintain the 
heat exchanger? 
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Since the fouling mainly affects the heat transfer coefficient, and fouling process 
is quite slow comparing to the dynamics of chemical process, it can be mathematically 
represented by: 
 ( )     ( )      ̇   
 
where U is the overall heat transfer coefficient at given time t, U0 is the initial overall 
heat transfer coefficient, b(t) exists because of fouling. 
The Way of Affecting System Dynamics 
Due to the way of affecting the system dynamics, faults can be classified into two 
categories: additive fault and multiplicative fault. It has to be pointed out that, while in 
many cases a particular fault can be classified as additive or multiplicative according to 
its nature, sometimes it may also be arbitrary. As we will see, the additive fault is much 
easier to detect than multiplicative fault, therefore it is better to consider a fault as an 
additive fault whenever possible [8]. 
Additive Fault 
In general, additive fault is assumed to be the deviation from the normal 
behavior, but independent of system configuration. Normally, the values of additive 
faults are zero. When an additive fault occur, it will cause changes of system variables 
[8]. For a process control system, an offset in a sensor or an actuator can be considered 
as a constant, and a drift in a sensor as a ramp. It is a typical additive fault. For a 
disturbance, it is also an extra unknown input. It is reasonable to consider that there is no 
physical difference between a disturbance and an additive fault. 
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Multiplicative Fault 
Multiplicative fault will change as some plant parameters change [8]. Typically, 
model errors or model uncertainties are considered as multiplicative faults. Model 
uncertainties are the gap between the real system and the model. In practice, we could 
not get the exact model of a real system. But if the model uncertainty is very small and 
will not cause relatively large model configuration, the model is always to be considered 
as the perfect model without model uncertainties. 
2.1.2 Fault Diagnosis 
 Fault Detection: Detection of the occurrence of faults in the functional 
units of the process, which lead to undesired or intolerable behavior of the 
whole system. 
 Fault Isolation: Localization (classification) of different faults. 
 Fault Identification: Determination of the type, magnitude and cause of 
the fault. 
2.2 Classification of Fault Detection Schemes  
2.2.1 Hardware Redundancy Based FD 
Hardware (or physical/parallel) redundancy is a traditional method for fault 
diagnosis. This approach uses multiple sensors to measure a particular variable. Also, a 
voting scheme is used to decide if and when a fault has occurred and its likely location 
amongst redundant system [1]. But the applicability is limited because of the extra cost 
and additional space required. Additionally, its application is limited on sensor faults. 
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Fig. 2.3 Schematic description of the hardware redundancy scheme 
2.2.2 Plausibility Test 
Plausibility test assumes a fault which results in the loss of plausibility. This 
technique evaluates outputs of process and compares with their rough behavior under 
normal operation. Examples include the sign and size of the measurements. But this 
method is less efficient in detecting faults and difficult for complex system [1, 9]. 
Fig. 2.4 Schematic description of plausibility scheme 
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2.2.3 Signal-based FD 
This approach is based on the properties of measured signals. Typical properties 
include magnitude and trend checking from the derivative, mean and variance, spectral 
power densities, correlation coefficient, etc., of the measured signals. Among these 
treatments of signal, absolute value and derivative (trend) of measured signal are the two 
most simply and widely used methods for fault detection. In signal-based fault detection, 
suitable upper and lower bound are set based on the knowledge of the system and 
required performance of the process. If the absolute value or derivative, etc., cross the 
limit, it means a fault occurs.   
 
Fig. 2.5 Schematic description of signal processing based scheme 
y(t): measured signal 
Y(t): processed signal (absolute value, derivative, etc.) 
Actuator Process Sensor 
Actuator 
Fault 
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This method is simple and easily implemented. But the disadvantages are 
obvious: it cannot detect a small fault when the signal is still within the desired range. 
Also, the efficiency is limited when the operating range is wide because of the possible 
large noise, disturbances and variation of input signals.  
2.2.4 Model-based FD 
The intuitive idea of model-based fault detection is from hardware redundancy. 
Model-based fault detection (or analytical redundancy) uses redundant analytical 
relationship between various measured variables rather than single variable. That is to 
say, model-based fault detection replaces the hardware redundancy by a mathematical 
model. This approach is achieved by comparing measured variables with their 
estimations from the mathematical model [1]. The differences between measured 
variables and estimations are called residuals. For a fault-free system, the residuals are 
zero. If a fault occurs, the corresponding residuals are not zero. Thus a residual, similar 
to the difference amongst hardware redundancy system, is a fault indicator of monitored 
process.     
The major advantage of this method is that no extra hardware components, but a 
control computer with related software, are required for fault detection. And fast 
development of computer technique makes this approach feasible and practicable [10].  
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Fig. 2.6 Schematic description of model-based fault diagnosis scheme 
 
Knowledge-based FD  
For large-scale systems, detailed quantitative mathematical model may not be 
available or may be costly and time-consuming to obtain. In this situation, it is better to 
choose knowledge-based methods which are based on qualitative models for process 
monitoring. These methods include expert systems, artificial neural networks, fuzzy 
logic, etc. [11]. 
Observer-based FD 
The first observer-based FDI system was proposed by Beard and Jones in the 
early 1970s [12], which marked a historical milestone in the development of the model-
based fault diagnosis [1]. And then Luenberger observers were first applied for fault 
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detection [13] and isolation [14-16]. In the late 1980s, the position of observer-based 
approach for FDI was established [17]. 
Observer-based method is one of the most applied model-based techniques for 
FDI. By comparing the process output with estimation, the residual is obtained.  
Unknown Input Observer (UIO) 
The idea of robust fault detection is to perfectly decouple the estimated state 
from unknown input (disturbances) based on the disturbances distribution. If the 
disturbances cannot affect the estimated states, the residual should be independent of the 
disturbances.  It is reported [18] that Frank [19] firstly used robust observer-based fault 
detection schemes for instrument failure detection. And then robust unknown input 
observers were intensively studied [20-26]. 
The main advantage of unknown input observer is the decoupling of 
disturbances. But the drawback is also obvious: model uncertainties would affect the 
performance of UIO. If the model uncertainties can be modeled as the additive term as 
external disturbances, the UIO can be used to decouple the effect of model uncertainties. 
However, it will inevitably increase the number of disturbances. If the number of 
unknown inputs including disturbances and faults is larger than the number of 
independent measurements, it is almost impossible to isolate the faults. For chemical 
processes, only a few state variables can usually be measured. Thus it is difficult to deal 
with model uncertainties.  
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2.2.5 A Comparison of Different Fault Detection Methods 
It has to be noted that comparing different fault detection methods is not easy. 
Choices are affected by several factors including information of the process, availability 
of the process mathematical model, complexity of the mathematical model, system 
nonlinearity, safety requirement, etc. If the analytical model is available and easy to be 
implemented, analytical model-based approach is preferred, since it is faster for fault 
detection and easier for on-line implementation. If the mathematical model is difficult to 
obtain, or if it is quite complex to implement, knowledge-based approach or signal-based 
method is preferred. 
2.3 Fault Diagnosis Approach for Chemical Process 
Chemical industry is one of the most important economic forces in the world 
[27]. Modern chemical plant is large-scale and highly complex [28] and operates under 
closed loop control for product quality and production efficiency. However, unexpected 
consequences, including major production loss, human injury and environmental impact, 
may occur when faults make the operating points deviating from the designed range. 
Only petrochemical industries may lose 20 billion dollars every year [29].  Therefore, 
there is considerable research in fault diagnosis [29-31], and various approaches for 
process monitoring and fault diagnosis have been studied and developed. These methods 
may be classified into three categories: process model-based method, multivariate 
statistical process monitoring and knowledge-based approaches [32]. 
One widely used approach in chemical industry is multivariate statistical process 
monitoring [33-37]. For a plant with normal operation, process data can be collected to 
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build an empirical correlation model by multivariate latent variable methods [38], 
including principal component analysis (PCA) and partial least squares (PLS), which 
have successful application in process industries. This empirical model with low 
dimension is able to capture the key information from normal operating data. The 
comparison between the current data and the empirical model is used to detect abnormal 
behavior by statistical tests. The contribution plots method [39] is then used for simple 
fault isolation. Past fault data is also required to improve fault diagnosis by isolating 
complex faults [40]. This method is able to handle the relatively complex system with a 
large number of measurements or without first principle analytical model. However, the 
fault-isolation design relies heavily on the past data with faults. These data are always 
unavailable or are difficult and expensive to obtain [32].  
Considering the drawbacks of multivariate statistical process monitoring method, 
an alternative approach for fault diagnosis is analytical model-based method. Process 
model-based method was first proposed and has also been received significant attention 
[1, 10, 41-46]. The limited information from measurements can not determine the 
presence of faults in chemical processes. In this method, the dynamics of systems and 
relationship between various variables (process model) can offer more information 
including the faults of the system. The extracted information from the process model and 
input/output data is called analytical redundancy. For fault diagnosis, a residual is 
always generated as a fault indicator of a particular fault through analytical redundancy. 
Fault is then detected and isolated by checking the value of a residual. If the relationship 
between a fault and the corresponding residual can be found, that fault can be identified. 
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Process model-based approach has been studied extensively over several decades for 
linear systems [1, 47, 48] and nonlinear systems [49-52]. But in the process, there are 
still some disturbances and model uncertainties. Rajaraman and Mannan et al. used 
parameter estimation method to estimate parameter with uncertainties [53]. But the 
nonlinear model is repeatedly linearized step by step, which takes a lot of computation 
time. Kazantzis and Kravaris proposed a systematic observer design framework for 
estimating unmeasured sate variables and applied this observer to a batch reactor and a 
CSTR [54]. But it is very difficult to use a similar method to design an observer for fault 
diagnosis. Therefore, an simple and efficient residual only sensitive to a particular fault 
but robust to other unknown inputs is desired. Unknown input observer is developed for 
decoupling the effects of other unknown inputs [47]. However, this method requires 
accurate mathematical model, which is very difficult to achieve or time-consuming to 
obtain or even unavailable for some complex chemical processes. Thus the application 
of model-based method is limited [55]. 
Another fault diagnosis method is the knowledge-based approach. Among 
knowledge-based approaches, wavelet neural network has been successfully applied in a 
wide range of applications [56]. Zhou and Mannan et al. applied feed forward neural 
networks to a batch reactor and a distillation column. However, the drawbacks of this 
method is long training time and it is difficult to extract symbolic knowledge from 
trained network [57]. 
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It is difficult to determine which method above is the best because every method 
has its own advantages and disadvantages. But when the analytical process model is 
available or easy to obtain, model-based method is always the first option. 
2.4 Unknown Input Observers 
In modeling, there are various types of uncertainties including model 
mismatches, parameter changes and unknown external excitation, which can be 
conveniently represented as unknown inputs or disturbances [58].  
The observer was first proposed and developed by Luenberger [59-61]. After the 
early development, observers with unknown inputs have been developed as the so-called 
unknown input observer (UIO) or disturbance-decoupled observers [62-72]. The first 
unknown input observer was proposed in 1973 [72] (the earliest document this thesis can 
find) by the response of a suitably selected dynamic system. Another approach was 
proposed in 1975 by designing a reduced-order observer without any knowledge of 
unknown inputs [62]. The existence conditions for the reduced-order observer was 
proposed by Kudva et al [64]. Bhattacharyya proposed a unknown input observer by 
geometric approach [63]. Geometric approach is one of the fields in the control theory, 
but the application of this approach requires a deep understanding of mathematics. 
Miller et al. proposed a reduced-order Luenberger observer for a linear time-invariant 
system by simplest matrix generalized inverse [66]. Fairman et al. designed disturbance 
decoupled observer via singular value decomposition [67]. Hou et al. derived an 
equivalent system, which is free of unknown inputs, for designing the disturbance 
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decoupled observer [58]. Yang et al. used straightforward matrix calculations to design a 
full-order and a reduced-order observer [71]. 
Because of the special feature of disturbance decoupling, all of the methods 
mentioned above helped to develop unknown input fault diagnostic observers.  
2.5 Unknown Input Diagnostic Observer 
The objective of unknown input diagnostic observer (UIDO) is to make the 
residual decoupled from unknown inputs (disturbances). But the original idea is to make 
the state estimation error decoupled from disturbances, and thus get residual independent 
disturbances. Watanabe et al. first proposed this approach for sensor fault detection and 
isolation by decoupling uncertainty. After that, Frank et al. generalized this method for 
fault detection and isolation [20, 73, 74]. Chen et al. applied this method to a realistic 
chemical process system example for robust FDI [75]. For robust FDI, many researchers 
made contributions to this area [26, 76-78]. Frank et al. used canonical form 
transformation method to simplify the computation [73]. Ding et al. generalized all of 
the methods above and used a very simple and general numerical method to design 
UIDO [1]. This design method has more freedom and the computation is quite efficient. 
This thesis mainly refers this method. 
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3. UNKNOWN INPUT DIAGNOSTIC OBSERVER (UIDO) DESIGN 
 
Luenberger first proposed the concept of observer to estimate system states in 
1964 [59], and then first proposed the functional observer for various purposes in 1971 
[61]. After that, observers have been studied extensively. The Unknown Input Observer 
(UIO) has received considerable attention in the literature [47, 62-66, 68-71, 73, 75, 78, 
79]. A brief introduction on the UIO has already been given in chapter 2. The study of 
UIO helps to design a special observer for fault diagnosis [1, 17, 18, 20, 22, 26, 29, 75-
81]. This kind of observer is called Unknown Input Diagnostic Observer (UIDO) [1]. 
The introduction can also be found in chapter 2. 
In the following subsections, Luenberger functional observer is first introduced. 
Then unknown input observer. Finally, UIDO design procedure and derivation is 
reviewed. The derivation mainly based on Ding’s book [1]. The only exception is the 
last subsection where instead of using parity space approach of Ding’s book [1], a simple 
alternative method is used to derive the inequality conditions and obtain the same 
results.     
3.1 Luenberger Functional Observer 
Considering continuous-time linear time-invariant (LTI) system as following: 
  ̇        (3.1) 
         (3.2) 
where      is a vector of state variables,       is a vector of input, and      is a 
vector of output variables. 
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As for system (3.1)-(3.2), the Luenberger type Functional Observer [61] is built 
for various purposes including feedback control and state estimation [59]. 
 ̇           (3.3) 
where      is a vector of observer state variables.   matrix is a Hurwitz matrix. The 
observer state z represents an estimation of   , where   is a transformation matrix. By 
modifying the matrix  , functional observer (3.3) can be identity state observer, reduced 
order observer, or other kinds of observers for various purposes [61]. 
3.2 Unknown Input Observer 
Considering continuous-time linear time-invariant (LTI) system with unknown 
inputs as follows: 
 ̇            (3.4) 
            (3.5) 
where      is a vector of state variables,       is a vector of input, and      is a 
vector of output variables.       is a vector of unknown input (uncertainty) vector. 
As for systems (3.4)-(3.5), unknown input observer is designed as following: 
 ̇           (3.6) 
where      is a vector of observer state variables.   matrix is a Hurwitz matrix. Similar 
to Luenberger functional observer, there is still a transformation matrix T between 
system state x and observer state z. The form of (3.6) is the same as Luenberger 
functional observer, but UIO is able to get the disturbances decoupled and still able to 
achieve various objectives by modifying the T matrix. Many researchers have been 
focused on this area to design a particular observer for a specific purpose, including state 
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estimation and feedback control purpose. Luenberger functional observer is a very 
general form, not only for the nominal system, but also for the system with disturbances 
or faults. The designing method is not introduced here. Interested readers can find 
introduction in chapter 2.      
3.3 Unknown Input Diagnostic Observer 
The objective of UIDO is to detect, isolate and identify the faults in the system. 
The method used is to generate a special residual which is sensitive to a specific fault but 
insensitive to other faults or disturbances, instead of trying to estimate the entire state 
vector. Through this way, the design freedom is significantly increased. The order of the 
UIDO could be equal to the order of the system, or it could be lower order or higher 
order. 
3.3.1 Problem Formulation 
The continuous-time linear time-invariant (LTI) system is given by 
  ̇                (3.7) 
                 (3.8) 
where      is a vector of state variables,       is a vector of input, and      is a 
vector of output variables.       is a vector of unknown input (uncertainty) vector, and 
      is a vector of fault. Matrices A, B,   ,   , C, D,    and    are appropriately 
dimensioned real constant matrices. We define 
    [         ] (3.9) 
    [         ] (3.10) 
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  [
  
  
  
] 
(3.11) 
where 
 
  {
                  (           ) 
                 (             )
                (           )
 
(3.12) 
Apply (3.9)-(3.12), we get 
    [    ] (3.13) 
    [    ] (3.14) 
Based on the Luenberger type observer, The Unknown Input Diagnostic Observer 
(UIDO) is formulated for given system (3.7)-(3.8) as following. 
  ̇           (3.15) 
And the residual is  
            (3.16) 
where      is a vector of observer state variables, and the residual is given by     . The 
G matrix is a Hurwitz stable. There is a state transformation matrix: T. The relationship 
between the state variables and the observer variables is that when that is no fault in the 
system and the sensors,  
    
   
  ( )|
   
   ( ) 
(3.17) 
The matrices T, G, H, L, v, w, q are to be selected. Some conditions are required to 
determine these matrices. The objective of the residual is to decouple the effect of the 
disturbance and to be sensitive to faults. In order to make the residual as the indicator of 
27 
faults, the residual must be zero when there are no faults in the system or sensors. When 
there are faults in the system or sensors, the residual must not be zero. 
Let’s define 
       (3.18) 
From (3.18), the error dynamics is represent by 
 ̇  (          )  (       )  (       ) 
 (       ) 
(3.19) 
If the following conditions hold, 
         (3.20) 
        (3.21) 
          (3.22) 
          (3.23) 
the error dynamics can be simplified to 
 ̇     (       )  (3.24) 
At steady state, 
 ̇     (       )    (3.25) 
From (3.25) we can get 
      (       )  (3.26) 
The residual r becomes 
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    (             )   (    )     
      (     )  (    )            
        (       )  (     )  (    )            
   [     (       )     ]  (     )  (    )       
(3.27) 
If the following additional conditions hold 
         (3.28) 
      (3.29) 
       (3.30) 
      (       )        (3.31) 
then 
   [     (       )     ]  (3.32) 
If      (       )      is invertable, 
   [     (       )     ]
    (3.33) 
Conditions (3.20)-(3.23) and (3.28)-(3.31) are called Luenberger conditions. 
 Summary of design condition as follows: 
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     (       )        
For convenience, these eight conditions are called Luenberger conditions in this thesis. 
3.3.2 Observer Design 
The observer design problem is to solve the Luenberger conditions. Because the 
canonical form is always an extremely convenient starting point for certain design 
problems [82], the pair (C, A) and the pair (w, G) is given in the canonical form [1]. 
Derivation Based on the (  ̅  ̅) Canonical Form
Canonical form for the system (3.7)-(3.8) is constructed by transforming the state 
vector to a new coordinate system where the system equations have a particular form 
[83]. 
 ̅            ̅ (3.34) 
Following Luenberger’s work [82], Korovin and Fomichev [83] found a way to select P 
matrix. From the observability, a composed matrix is selected as following. 
  
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
   
    
     
  
 
   
    
     
 
   
    ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ,   [
  
  
 
  
],                        (3.35) 
Then inverse the v matrix 
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     [          ] (3.36) 
Let 
     [       
        
      
    ] (3.37) 
System (3.7)-(3.8) is then represented by observer canonical form 
  ̇̅        ̅                (3.38) 
        ̅             (3.39) 
Let 
  ̅         ̅       ̅̅ ̅        ̅       ̅    
   (3.40) 
System (3.38)-(3.39) becomes 
  ̇̅   ̅ ̅   ̅   ̅    ̅   (3.41) 
    ̅ ̅             (3.42) 
where 
 
 ̅  [
        
   
        
],        ̅  
[
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 (3.43) 
 
     
[
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
 
             
[
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
 
        (3.44) 
      (     )   
    ,      (     )   
     (3.45) 
Let’s split  ̅ matrix into two parts [1], because there is one property of    matrix we can 
use later. 
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  ̅        ̅ (3.46) 
where 
        (         ) (3.47) 
 
    
[
 
 
 
 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
                (3.48) 
   ̅ is the rest of  ̅ matrix. 
Let’s take matrix G, w in the observer canonical form [1]. 
   [   ] (3.49) 
where 
` 
   
[
 
 
 
 
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
    (   ) (3.50) 
 
  [
  
 
  
]     (3.51) 
   [    ] (3.52) 
 (w,G) is set in the canonical observer form. Because every observer pair can be 
similarity transformed into canonical form, this observer canonical form does not lose 
generality. 
Derivation from Luenberger Condition TA=GT+LC [1] 
From (3.20) and (3.40),  
      ̅          ̅ (3.53) 
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Let  
  ̅      , and    ̅   ̅   (3.54) 
From (3.46),(3.49) ,(3.53) ,(3.54) 
  ̅   [   ] ̅   ̅ ̅ (3.55) 
Let  
 
 ̅  [
  
 
  
], and  ̅  [
  
 
  
] (3.56) 
Then  
 
[
  
 
  
]          [
  
 
  
]  [
  
 
  
]  ̅ (3.57) 
 
Expand (3.57) from the last row, we can get 
           (   ̅      )  
From the last second row 
          
  (   ̅      )   (     ̅        )  
From the last third row 
          
  (   ̅      )  
  (     ̅        )  
 (     ̅        ) 
 
    
        
    (   ̅      )  
    (     ̅        )  
     
 (   ̅      ) 
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    (   ̅      )  
    (     ̅        )  
     
 (   ̅      ) 
 
From the first row 
              ̅  
Derivation from Luenberger Condition vC-wT=0 [1] 
From (3.28), (3.40) and (3.54),  
   ̅    ̅    (3.58) 
From (3.52), (3.56) and (3.58) 
      ̅ (3.59) 
Substitute (3.59) into the expansion of (3.57) 
        ̅   (      ) ̅  
        ̅  
  (      ) ̅   (          ) ̅  
    
      ̅  
    (      ) ̅  
      (      ) ̅  
 (      ) ̅ 
 
      ̅  
    (      ) ̅  
      (      ) ̅  
 (      ) ̅ 
 
   ̅  
  (      ) ̅  
      (      ) ̅   (      ) ̅    (3.60) 
Lemma 3.1: 
                 
       ,  
holds if and only if      
   .  
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Further       for           .  
And      
    for               
From lemma 3.1 and (3.60) 
   ̅  
     
 (      ) ̅  
       
     
 (                ) ̅  
        
                 
    
           
Then the expansion of (3.57) become  
      ̅  
        ̅   (      ) ̅  
    
         ̅  
       (      ) ̅  
           (                ) ̅  
           ̅  
         (      ) ̅  
         (                ) ̅    
    
      ̅  
    (      ) ̅  
      (                ) ̅  
        
      ̅  
    (      ) ̅  
      (                ) ̅  
        
Let define: 
  ̅   (          )                     (3.61) 
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And 
  ̅   , and  ̅  [ ̅     ̅        ̅ ] (3.62) 
Then we can get  
 
 ̅
[
 
 
 
 
 ̅  
    
 ̅  
      
 
 ̅  
 ]
 
 
 
 
   (3.63) 
Thus  
     ̅  ̅  
       ̅  ̅    ̅    ̅  
    
        ̅  ̅  
        ̅    ̅  
            ̅     ̅  
          ̅  ̅  
          ̅    ̅  
          ̅     ̅    
    
     ̅  ̅  
     ̅    ̅  
       ̅     ̅  
        
     ̅  ̅  
     ̅    ̅  
       ̅     ̅  
        
Thus 
 
 ̅  
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   ̅    
 
 
 ̅    
 
 ̅   
 ̅ 
 
 ̅    
 
 
 ̅ 
 
 
 
 ̅ 
 
 
 
     
 ̅      ̅ 
  ̅  
 
 ̅ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ]
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 ̅
 ̅  
 
 ̅  
        
 ̅  
      
 
 ̅  
   
 ̅  
   ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (3.64) 
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During the calculation, it is more convenient to use matrix A rather than matrix A0. Thus 
it is necessary to convert matrix A0 to matrix A. 
 
[
 ̅
 ̅  
 
 ̅  
 
]  [
   
  ̅    
 
  ̅  
     
 
 
 
  ̅  
    
 
 
 
 
] [
 ̅
 ̅(      ̅)
 
 ̅(      ̅)
 
] (3.65) 
The formula of (3.65) is obvious, thus there is no need to prove. 
According to (3.46) and (3.65), we can get: 
 
[
 ̅
 ̅  
 
 ̅  
   
]  [
   
  ̅    
 
  ̅  
     
 
 
 
  ̅  
    
 
 
 
 
] [
 ̅
 ̅ ̅
 
 ̅ ̅   
] (3.66) 
According to (3.66) 
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 ̅  
    
 ̅  
      
 
 ̅  
 ]
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   ̅  
           ̅  
  ̅  
         ̅    
 
  ̅  
     
 
 
 
  ̅  
        
    
 
  ̅  
 
  ̅  
          
    
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
  ̅  
    
 
 
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
[
 ̅
 ̅ ̅
 
 ̅ ̅ 
] (3.67) 
Let’s define: 
 
   
[
 
 
 
   ̅  
           ̅  
  ̅  
         ̅    
 
  ̅  
     
 
 
 
  ̅  
        
    
 
  ̅  
 
  ̅  
          
    
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
  ̅  
    
 
 
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
 (3.68) 
Then (3.67) becomes 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 ̅  
    
 ̅  
      
 
 ̅  
 ]
 
 
 
 
   [
 ̅
 ̅ ̅
 
 ̅ ̅ 
] (3.69) 
According to (3.63) and (3.69), we can get:  
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 ̅
[
 
 
 
 
 ̅  
    
 ̅  
      
 
 ̅  
 ]
 
 
 
 
  ̅  [
 ̅
 ̅ ̅
 
 ̅ ̅ 
]    (3.70) 
Let’s define: 
     ̅   (3.71) 
where: 
    [             ] (3.72) 
According to (3.70)-(3.71), we can get: 
 
  [
 ̅
 ̅ ̅
 
 ̅ ̅ 
]    (3.73) 
According to (3.64), (3.66), (3.68), (3.71) and (3.72), we can get: 
 
 ̅  [
         
      
 
    
 
 
 
 
    
          
     
 
 
 
 
] [
 ̅
 ̅ ̅
 
 ̅ ̅   
] (3.74) 
According to Lemma 3.1 and (3.61), we can get: 
 
{
         ̅                          
                                       
 (3.75) 
From (3.75) 
 
 ̅  
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  ̅       ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (3.76) 
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From (3.54), (3.76) 
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   (3.77) 
According to and (3.62), (3.68), (3.71), (3.72) 
 
   [ ̅     ̅        ̅ ]
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 (3.78) 
According to (3.77), (3.78) 
 
   [
    
    
 
      
]     (3.79) 
Derivation Based on Original System 
The results above are based on the (  ̅  ̅) observer canonical form. Now it’s time 
to remove the canonical form. 
Let 
  ̅         ̅       ̅̅ ̅        ̅       ̅    
   (3.80) 
According to (3.73) and (3.80) 
 
  [
 
  
 
   
]    (3.81) 
According to (3.74) and (3.80) 
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  [
         
      
 
    
 
 
 
 
    
          
     
 
 
 
 
] [
 
  
 
     
] (3.82) 
Derivation from Luenberger Condition: TEd - LFd =0 and VFd=0 [1] 
According to (3.79) and (3.82), 
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]    [
    
    
 
      
]           (3.83) 
According to (3.30) and (3.83) 
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]    [
    
    
 
      
]      (3.84) 
Let’s expand (3.84) from the last row to the first row: 
                     
                                
       
                                     
    
       
              
                               
   
 
From the expanded formula of (3.84) and (3.30), we can construct a new form as 
following: 
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[             ] [
    
      
 
       
 
 
 
   
    
 
 
 
  
]    (3.85) 
Thus 
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]    (3.86) 
Derivation from Luenberger Condition:           and    
  (       )  
      
The parity space approach can solve these two Luenberger conditions [1].  But 
this thesis uses a different but more direct and simple method to derive from these two 
conditions. 
In order to simplify the problem, let’s make 
       (3.87) 
According to (3.23), (3.79) and (3.82) 
 
[
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]    [
    
    
 
      
]      (3.88) 
Let’s expand (3.88) 
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From the expansion of (3.88), we can construct a new form as following: 
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]    (3.89) 
3.3.3 Summary of UIDO Design for Fault Diagnosis 
For the unknown input observer,  
  ̇             
              
The design procedure has the following steps [1].  
Step 1: Solve   [            ]  [   ] for vs; 
where 
    [                       ]  
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]  
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]  
 
     [
    
      
 
       
 
 
 
   
    
 
 
 
  
]  
It is solvable if and only if 
     [            ]       [        ]  
Step 2: Given vs, calculate v and T; 
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]  
Step 3: Select G and w; 
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where   [
  
 
  
]     is chosen to make G Hurwitz. 
   [    ]  
Step 4: Calculate L, H, q; 
 
   [
    
    
 
      
]         
          
       
3.3.4 MATLAB Program for UIDO Design 
The purpose of the MATLAB program is to design an unknown input diagnostic 
observer (3.15)-(3.16) for linear system (3.7)-(3.8). 
The input of this MATLAB program is the observer order s, and linear system 
matrices A, B, Ed, Ef, C, D, Fd and Ff. Based on the linear system, the unknown input 
diagnostic observer can be designed automatically. And the observer eigenvalues are 
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designed to be faster than the linear system but slower than the ten times fast of the 
linear system. The purpose of the upper limit is to be tolerant to noises. The output of 
this MATLAB program is the UIDO matrices T, G, H, L, v, w and q. 
The MATLAB program is as follows: 
function [Tout,Gout,Hout,Lout,vout,wout,qout] = ObserDesign( s,A,B,Ed,Ef,C,D,Fd,Ff ) 
%% The objective of this function is to design UIDO 
%% Detailed explanation goes here 
%% Input 
% s: Observer order 
% A,B,Ed,Ef,C,D,Fd,Ff are the system matrices 
% dx/dt = A*x + B*u + Ed*d + Ef*f 
%     y = C*x + D*u + Fd*d + Ff*f 
%% Output 
% Tout,Gout,Hout,Lout,vout,wout,qout are the observer matrices 
% dz/dt = G*z + H*u + L*y 
%     r = v*y - w*z - q*u 
 % The eigenvalues of Observer are designed to be faster than the system but slower than 10 
times fast % of the system. 
%% Calculation begins 
n=size(A,1); 
m=size(C,1); 
ku=size(B,2); 
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kf=size(Ef,2); 
kd=size(Ed,2); 
  
Hos=zeros((s+1)*m,n); 
Hfs=zeros((s+1)*m,(s+1)*kf); 
Hds=zeros((s+1)*m,(s+1)*kd); 
  
%get Hos 
for i=1:s+1 
    row_start=(i-1)*m+1; 
    row_end=i*m; 
    Hos(row_start:row_end,1:n)=C*A^(i-1); 
end 
  
%get Hfs and Hds 
for i=1:s+1 %i represent row i 
    for j=1:s+1 %j represent column j 
        row_start=(i-1)*m+1; 
        row_end=i*m; 
        column_start_d=(j-1)*kd+1; 
        column_end_d=j*kd; 
        column_start_f=(j-1)*kf+1; 
        column_end_f=j*kf; 
        if i==j 
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            Hfs(row_start:row_end,column_start_f:column_end_f)=Ff; 
            Hds(row_start:row_end,column_start_d:column_end_d)=Fd; 
        elseif i-j>=1 
            Hfs(row_start:row_end,column_start_f:column_end_f)=vpa(C*A^(i-j-1)*Ef,100); 
            Hds(row_start:row_end,column_start_d:column_end_d)=vpa(C*A^(i-j-1)*Ed,100); 
        end 
    end 
end 
H_od_s=[Hos Hds]; 
H_fod_s=[Hfs Hos Hds]; 
  
eigOfSys=max(real(eig(A))); % find the system speed 
  
%% step 1: Check rank and original system stability, and calculate vs 
if rank(H_fod_s)>rank(H_od_s) && eigOfSys<0 
    vs=vpa(null(H_od_s')',100); 
    row_vs=size(vs,1); 
    numi=1; 
    vs_correct=vs(numi,:); 
    while rank(vs_correct*Hfs)==0 && numi<row_vs 
        numi=numi+1; 
        vs_correct=vs(numi,:); 
    end 
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    %% Step 2: Given vs, calculate v and T 
    Vs_matrix=zeros(s+1,m); 
    for i=1:s+1 
        Vs_matrix(i,1:m)=vs_correct( ((i-1)*m+1) : i*m ); 
    end 
    v=Vs_matrix(s+1,:); 
     
    % get T_x_z 
    Vs_T=zeros(s,m*s); 
    for i=1:s 
        for j=1:s 
            if i+j<=s+1 
                Vs_T(i,(j-1)*m+1:j*m)=Vs_matrix(i+j,:); %5.71 
            end 
        end 
    end 
    T_x_z=Vs_T*Hos(1:s*m,:); 
     
    %% Step 3: get G and w 
    G0=[zeros(1,s-1);eye(s-1)]; 
    eigens=zeros(s,1); 
    temp=(10-1)*eigOfSys/(s+1); 
    for i=1:s 
        eigens(i)=eigOfSys+i*temp; 
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    end 
    g0=poly(eigens)'; 
    g=zeros(s,1); 
    for i=1:s 
        g(i)=-g0(s+2-i); 
    end 
    G=[G0,g]; 
    eig(G); 
     
    % get w 
    w=zeros(1,s); 
    w(1,s)=1; 
     
    %% Step 4: Calculate L, H, q 
    % get L 
    L=-Vs_matrix(1:s,:)-g*v; 
    % get H q 
    q=v*D; 
    H=T_x_z*B-L*D; 
     
    %% Prepare to return designed matrix 
    Tout=T_x_z; 
    Gout=G; 
    Hout=H; 
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    Lout=L; 
    vout=v; 
    wout=w; 
    qout=q; 
else 
    Tout='No Solution'; 
    Gout='No Solution'; 
    Hout='No Solution'; 
    Lout='No Solution'; 
    vout='No Solution'; 
    wout='No Solution'; 
    qout='No Solution'; 
end 
end 
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3.3.5 UIDO Design for Fault Diagnosis for Linear Systems 
Consider a linear system with multiple faults and disturbances: 
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 (3.91) 
There are    unknown disturbances and    unknown faults in this system. For 
fault diagnosis,    UIDO need to be designed.  
Design of i
th
 UIDO: detect, isolate and identify    
Step 1 Rearrangement of the System  
In this step, only    is considered as the fault, and the other faults and 
disturbances are all considered as disturbances  
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Step 2 Design the UIDO Based on System (3.92)-(3.93) 
According to section 3.3.3, the ith UIDO can be designed as follows. 
  ̇                 (3.94) 
                   (3.95) 
Equations (3.94)-(3.95) can be designed automatically using the MATLAB 
program in section 3.3.4 
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4. APPLICATION TO EXOTHERMIC CSTRS
This chapter presents the results obtained by the application of the algorithms in 
Chapter 3 to exothermic Continuous Stirred-tank Reactors (CSTRs). The chemical 
reaction rate is quite sensitive to the system temperature. For an exothermic CSTR 
system, runaway reaction or thermal explosion may occur if the heat generation rate 
exceeds the heat removal rate. This energy accumulation may result from malfunction of 
cooling system or temperature sensors and it could seriously affect the closed-loop 
temperature-control system. Therefore, it is very important to detect faults in sensors and 
faults in cooling jacket in the CSTR system. 
As for the model of CSTR systems, it will be assumed that the exothermic CSTR 
is adequately modeled by three differential equations: 
 A component mass balance for the reactant.
 An energy balance for the reactor.
 An energy balance for the cooling jacket.
Therefore the model includes three state variables: component concentration 
(  ), reactor temperature (T) and cooling jacket temperature (  ). Three representative 
case studies will be presented here: 
 Case 1: two possible faults in the reactor and cooling jacket temperature
sensors. 
 Case 2: one possible fault in the reactor temperature sensor, and another
one in heat exchanger. 
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 Case 3: location of possible faults is the same as case 2, but a model 
uncertainty of the reaction activation energy is introduced in the model. 
Each of the case studies will involve a different reaction system.       
4.1 Case 1: Two Temperature Sensor Faults 
For some highly exothermic CSTRs with explosive reactants or products 
typically in munitions factories, the reactor and the cooling system have to be well 
maintained. And the fouling in the cooling system is relatively easy to be regularly 
maintained. The possible risks may come from the presence of faults in the temperature 
sensors during the operation process. Therefore, this case only considers one possible 
fault in the temperature sensor of reactor and the other possible fault in the temperature 
sensor of cooling jacket. 
4.1.1 Introduction 
RDX, known as Research Department Formula X, is an explosive nitroamine 
which is widely used in military and industrial applications. It was developed as an 
explosive which was several times as powerful as TNT, and RDX was widely used 
during World War II. RDX is stable in storage and is considered one of the most 
powerful and brisant of the military high explosives [84]. During World War II, the US 
produced about 15,000 long tons (15,000 t) per month and Germany about 7,000 long 
tons (7,100 t) per month [85]. RDX has several advantages for advanced propulsion, 
including better performances (large amount of gas, high energy, high specific impulse 
for rockets and high impetus for guns), safety (difficult accidental ignition and low 
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sensitivity in open air), and environment friendliness (smokeless, nontoxic, no corrosive 
combustion products) [86]. 
There are several methods of RDX manufacture including: (1) the reaction of 
nitric acid with hexamine [87], (2) reaction of the mixture of hexamine, ammonium 
nitrate and nitric acid [88], (3) preparation from formaldehyde, sulphamic acid and nitric 
acid [88], (4) preparation from paraformaldehyde, ammonium nitrate and acetic 
anhydride [88], (5) preparation from hexamine dinitrate, ammonium dinitrate and acetic 
anhydride [89]. The most widely used method in munitions factory is the reaction of 
hexamine with excess concentrated nitric acid. But this method is very dangerous in its 
reaction process [90]. 
4.1.2 Reactive System 
The chemical reaction of hexamine and nitric acid to manufacture RDX is 
expressed by the following equation including main reaction and side reaction [90]. 
 
                  
 
 
         
 
 
   (    )  
 
 
       
 
 
    
(Hexamine)                             (RDX) 
      A                B                      C                   D                   E               F                  
(4.1) 
The reaction rate is: 
 
           ( 
  
  
)  
     (4.2) 
where CB is the major component in the mixture, and is assumed to be constant during 
the process. 
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4.1.3 Modeling 
Model of CSTR 
The mass balance in the reactor is: 
 
  ̇  
 
 
(       )     (4.3) 
The heat balance in the reactor is: 
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(     )  
(    )
   
   
  (    )
    
 (4.4) 
The heat balance in the cooling jacket is: 
 
 ̇  
  
  
(       )  
  (    )
       
 (4.5) 
Table 4.1 gives the process parameters. These parameters are mainly taken from 
[91], except that instead of assuming constant cooling temperature, the cooling jacket 
dynamics is included in the model.   
Modeling of Faults    
Two faults will be considered: 
 An additive fault in reactor temperature sensor 
 An additive fault in cooling jacket temperature sensor 
No disturbances and other faults are considered in this case. 
The system output is: 
 
[
  
  
]  [
    
     
] (4.6) 
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Table 4.1: Process parameters of RDX manufacturing in CSTR  
Parameter Description Value Unit 
V Volume of the reactor 630 L 
k0 Frequency factor of Arrehenius form 2.06×10
4
  (L/mole)
1.28
·s
-1
 
Ea Activation energy 47149  J/mol 
∆H Enthalpy of reaction (exothermic) 87319.5  J/mol 
ρ Density of the reacting mixture 1317.5 g/L 
Cp Heat capacity of the reacting mixture 1.989  J/(g·K) 
Fin Feed flow rate 0.79  L/s 
CAin Inlet feed concentration of component A 0.9851  mol/L 
CBin Inlet feed concentration of component B 20.9087  mol/L 
Tin Inlet feed temperature 298.15 K 
Vw Volume of the cooling jacket 60  L 
ρw Density of the reacting coolant 1000  g/L 
Cpw Heat capacity of the coolant 4.2  J/(g·K) 
U Overall heat transfer coefficient 1400 w/m
2
·K 
Å Overall heat transfer area 7  m
2
 
Twin Inlet coolant temperature 293.15  K 
Fwin Inlet coolant flow rate 2  L/s 
R Gas constant 8.3144621  J/(K·mol) 
 
CA, T, Tw are state variables. At steady state: 
CA,s=0.3615 mol/L 
Ts=301.2448K 
Tw=297.5088 K 
4.1.4 Observer Design 
There are two possible faults in the system, thus two observers are required. Each 
observer is to estimate one fault, and the effect of the other fault is decoupled on the 
observer and residual.  
56 
 
Observer 1: Estimate the Reactor Temperature Sensor Fault 
The objective of this observer is to estimate the possible fault in the reactor 
temperature sensor. In order to decouple the effect of the other possible fault in the 
cooling jacket temperature sensor, cooling jacket fault is considered to be disturbance.  
The model of CSTR is linearized at steady state (fault and disturbance are zero). 
The linearized system is as follows (3.7)-(3.8): 
  ̇                 
                  
where: 
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Based on the linearized system, the unknown input diagnostic observer is as follows 
(3.15)-(3.16): 
  ̇            
             
Based on the observer, the estimated fault is as follows (3.33): 
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   [     (       )     ]
     
According to section (3.3.3), set s=3, then: 
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     [            ]         [        ]      
Thus it is solvable of   [            ]  [   ] for    
Step 1 Solve   [            ]  [   ] for   ; 
After calculation,  
    [                ]   
Step 2 According to vs, get v and T; 
        [       ]   
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Step 3 Choose g to make G stable, and w is also determined. 
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   [   ]   
Step 4 Get L, H, q; 
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Observer 2: Estimate Cooling Jacket Temperature Sensor Fault 
The objective of this observer is to estimate the possible fault in the cooling 
jacket temperature sensor. In order to decouple the effect of the other possible fault in 
the reactor temperature sensor, reactor temperature sensor fault is considered to be 
disturbance.  
The model of CSTR is linearized at steady state (fault and disturbance are zero). 
The linearized system is as follows (3.7)-(3.8): 
  ̇                 
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where: 
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Based on the linearized system, unknown input diagnostic observer is as follows (3.15)-
(3.16): 
  ̇            
             
Based on the observer, the estimated fault is as follows (3.33): 
   [     (       )     ]
     
According to (3.3.3), set s=3, then: 
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  [
       
       
        
]  
   [       ]  
   [   ]  
 q=0  
4.1.5 Simulation 
The system model (4.3)-(4.6) and observers are simulated by MATLAB. The 
initial state of the system is the steady state without fault. White noises with normal 
distribution have been added to the temperature sensor. Two step faults in the 
temperature sensors occur at different times. The initial state of the observers is zero. 
The eigenvalues of observers are set negative making sure the observers are stable.   
Simulation Conditions for the Reactor 
Initial Conditions 
 
[
   
  
   
]  [
      
        
        
]  
Noise 
Normally distributed random noises with zero mean and standard deviation 0.1 
were simulated with the MATLAB function “randn” and were added to the simulated 
values of   and   . 
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Faults 
         (it occurs at t=300s)  
          (it occurs at t=100s)  
Time 
 Initial Time:         
 Final Time:            
Simulation Conditions for the Observers 
Initial Conditions 
 
Observer 1: [
  
  
  
]  [
 
 
 
]  
 
Observer 2: [
  
  
  
]  [
 
 
 
]  
Eigenvalues 
Based on the eigenvalues of linearized systems, observer eigenvalues are selected 
faster than the linearized system but slower than ten times the speed of the linearized 
system. 
Linearized System 1: eig = { -0.0031 + 0.0019i, -0.0031 - 0.0019i, -0.0755}; 
Linearized System 2: eig = { -0.0031 + 0.0019i, -0.0031 - 0.0019i, -0.0755}; 
Observer 1: eig = {-0.0102, -0.0173, -0.0244}; 
Observer 2: eig = {-0.0102, -0.0173, -0.0244}; 
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4.1.6 Simulation Results and Discussion 
To validate the results, nonlinear model of the CSTR system (4.3)-(4.6), the 
corresponding linearized system (3.7)-(3.8) and the observers (3.15)-(3.16) have been 
programmed and simulated by MATLAB. The simulation results are described in the 
following subsections. In order to better evaluate the performance of the unknown input 
diagnostic observer, states of system and observers along with residual signal and 
estimated faults are plotted. 
System Results for the Reactor 
The CSTR system starts at steady state. Fig. 4.1 shows that at time t=100s and 
t=300s, there are temperature step changes. But we can not determine if the step signals 
from the measurements are caused by system state changes or sensor faults. Therefore, it 
is necessary to build an indicator signal (residual) for fault detection. 
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Fig. 4.1 CSTR state variables over time 
Simulation Results for the Observers 
Observer 1 
Fig. 4.2 shows that observer 1 only responds at t = 300s (when reactor 
temperature sensor fault occurs), and has no response at t = 100s (when cooling jacket 
temperature sensor fault occurs).  
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Fig. 4.2 Observer 1 state variables over time 
 
Observer 2 
Fig. 4.3 shows that observer 2 responds at t = 100s (when cooling jacket 
temperature sensor fault occurs). 
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Fig. 4.3 Observer 2 state variables over time 
 
Fault Diagnosis 
Even though the observer states can represent the presence of a specific fault, 
observer states are also affected by the system state. We can not determine the presence 
of faults by observer states. It is necessary to check the residual signal, which is only 
sensitive to a specific fault at steady state.  
Residual works as an indicator of a specific fault. Fig. 4.4 shows that at t = 300s 
(and Fig. 4.6 at t = 100s), there is a big spike. This change is caused by the reactor 
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temperature sensor fault. Sensor output signals are the input of observers. Step change in 
the sensor signal may cause instant large deviations of observer sates and residual at 
transient period can not be used to identify the size of fault. After a while, the residual 
comes back to steady state.  
From Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.6, the new steady states of residuals are nonzero, which 
successfully indicates the presence of faults. That is to say, residual signals are enough 
for fault detection and isolation. But just from the residual signal, it is still difficult to 
evaluate the size of fault. From (3.33), we can estimate the value of fault based on the 
residual signal. Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.7 show that the estimated faults are around the real 
faults within an error band caused by sensor noises.    
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Observer 1 
 
Fig. 4.4 Residual for reactor temperature sensor fault over time 
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Fig. 4.5 Estimated fault compared with real fault in reactor temperature sensor 
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Observer 2 
 
Fig. 4.6 Residual for cooling jacket temperature sensor fault over time 
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Fig. 4.7 Estimated fault compared with real fault in cooling jacket temperature sensor 
 
So far, fault detection, isolation and identification have been achieved at the 
same time. By observing the simulation results, it is easy to immediately notice that the 
unknown input diagnostic observer works well on this exothermic reactor. 
4.2 Case 2: One Sensor Fault and One Component Fault 
In this case, two possible faults are concerned: one possible fault is in the reactor 
temperature sensor and the other one is in the heat exchanger caused by fouling. The 
other parts of CSTR system are well maintained. 
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4.2.1 Introduction 
Acetic anhydride is an organic compound widely used in the production of 
cellulose acetate, explosives, aspirin, aceticacid, and in others organic synthesis. Its 
handling can be dangerous. It is an irritant and highly flammable liquid and, in gaseous 
phase, it can release toxic vapors. Moreover, the acetic anhydride vapor/air mixtures, at 
temperatures above 322K, maybe come explosive. The acetic anhydride hydrolysis is 
another reaction with high thermal sensitivity [92, 93]. 
4.2.2 Reactive System  
The hydrolysis of acetic anhydride, is an exothermic reaction in liquid phase 
catalyzed by sulfuric acid. It can be written as follows:  
 
(     )  ( )      ( )  
              
→                   ( ) 
                             A                     B                                     C 
(4.7) 
The reaction rate is: 
 
        
(
  
  )   (4.8) 
where    is the sulfuric acid concentration. 
4.2.3 Modeling 
Model of CSTR 
The mass balance in the reactor is: 
 
  ̇  
 
 
(       )     (4.9) 
The heat balance in the reactor is: 
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The heat balance in the cooling jacket is: 
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) (4.11) 
Table 4.2 gives the values of parameters. The kinetic parameters are from [92, 93].  
Modeling of Faults    
Two faults will be considered: 
 An component fault in cooling jacket because of fouling 
 An additive fault in reactor temperature sensor 
No disturbances and other faults are considered in this case. 
The system output is: 
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] (4.12) 
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Table 4.2: Process parameters of acetic anhydride hydrolysis in CSTR 
Parameter Description Value Unit 
V Volume of the reactor 100 L 
k0 Frequency factor of Arrehenius form 1.85×10
13
 L/(mole·s) 
Ea Activation energy 93446 J/mol 
∆H Enthalpy of reaction (exothermic) 58520 J/mol 
ρ Density of the reacting mixture 1050 g/L 
Cp Heat capacity of the reacting mixture 3.533 J/(g·K) 
Fin Feed flow rate 1.5 L/s 
CAin Inlet feed concentration of component A 5 mol/L 
Cs Sulfuric acid concentration in CSTR 2 mol/L 
Tin Inlet feed temperature 323.15 K 
Vw Volume of the cooling jacket 30 L 
ρw Density of the reacting coolant 1000 g/L 
Cpw Heat capacity of the coolant 4.2 J/(g·K) 
U Overall heat transfer coefficient 400 w/m
2
·K 
Å Overall heat transfer area 10 m
2
 
Twin Inlet coolant temperature 293.15 K 
Fwin Inlet coolant flow rate 2 L/s 
R Gas constant 8.3144621 J/(K·mol) 
 
  ,  ,    are state variables. At steady state: 
    =0.0439 mol/L 
  =365.9042 K 
    =316.6191 K 
4.2.4 Observer Design 
There are two possible faults in the system, thus two observers are required. Each 
observer is to estimate one fault, and the effect of the other fault is decoupled on the 
observer and residual. 
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Observer 1: Estimate the Reactor Temperature Sensor Fault 
The objective of this observer is to estimate the possible fault in the reactor 
temperature sensor. In order to decouple the effect of the other possible fault in the heat 
exchange coefficient caused by fouling in the heat exchanger, heat exchanger fault is 
considered to be disturbance. 
The model of CSTR is linearized at steady state (f1, d are zero). The linearized 
system is as follows (3.7)-(3.8): 
  ̇                 
                  
where: 
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Based on the linearized system, the unknown input diagnostic observer is as follows 
(3.15)-(3.16): 
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  ̇            
             
Based on the observer, the estimated fault is as follows (3.33): 
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According to section (3.3.3), set s=2, then: 
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Thus it is solvable of   [            ]  [   ] for    
Step 1: Solve   [            ]  [   ] for   ; 
After calculation,  
    [        ]  [                                           ]  
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Step 2: According to vs, get v and T; 
        [              ]  
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Step 3: Choose g to make G stable, and w is also determined. 
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]  
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Step 4: Get L, H, q; 
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Observer 2: Estimate heat exchange coefficient 
The objective of this observer is to estimate the possible fault in the heat 
exchanger. In order to decouple the effect of the other possible fault in the reactor 
temperature sensor, reactor temperature sensor fault is considered to be disturbance. 
The model of CSTR is linearized at steady state (f2, d are zero). The linearized 
system is as follows (3.7)-(3.8): 
  ̇                 
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where: 
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Based on the linearized system, the unknown input diagnostic observer is as follows 
(3.15)-(3.16): 
  ̇            
             
Based on the observer, the estimated fault is as follows (3.33): 
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According to section (3.3.3), set s=3, then: 
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 q=0  
4.2.5 Simulation 
The system model (4.9)-(4.12) and observers are simulated by MATLAB. The 
initial state of the system is the steady state without fault. White noises with normal 
distribution have been added to temperature sensors. One step fault in the temperature 
sensor and one ramp fault in heat exchanger occur at different time. The initial state of 
the observers is zero. The eigenvalues of observers are set negative making sure the 
observers are stable. 
Simulation Conditions for the Reactor 
Initial Conditions 
 
[
   
  
   
]  [
      
        
        
]  
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Noise 
Normally distributed random noises with zero mean and standard deviation 0.1 
were simulated with the MATLAB function “randn” and were added to the simulated 
values of   and   . 
Faults 
        (it occurs at t=300s) 
           (it occurs at t=100s and increases continuously. f2 is linear to 
time. At t=5000s, f2=0.1U) 
Time 
 Initial Time:         
 Final Time:            
Simulation Conditions for the Observers 
Initial Conditions 
 Observer 1: [
  
  
]  [
 
 
]  
 
Observer 2: [
  
  
  
]  [
 
 
 
]  
Eigenvalues 
Based on the eigenvalues of linearized systems, observer eigenvalues are selected 
faster than the linearized system but slower than ten times the speed of the linearized 
system. 
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Linearized System 1: eig = { -0.0217, -0.1032, -1.6086}; 
Linearized System 2: eig = { -0.0217, -0.1032, -1.6086}; 
Observer 1: eig = {-0.0868, -0.1520}; 
Observer 2: eig = {-0.0706, -0.1194, -0.1683}; 
4.2.6 Simulation Results and Discussions 
To validate the results, nonlinear model of the CSTR system (4.9)-(4.12), the 
corresponding linearized system (3.7)-(3.8) and the observers (3.15)-(3.16) have been 
programmed and simulated by MATLAB. The simulation results are described in the 
following subsections. In order to better show out the superiority of the unknown input 
diagnostic observer, states of system and observers along with residual signal and 
estimated faults are plotted.  
System Results for the Reactor 
The CSTR system starts at steady state. Fig. 4.8 shows that at time t = 300s and t 
= 100s, there is a step change in reactor temperature and a ramp change in cooling 
jacket, respectively. But we still can not determine that the signal changes from the 
measurements are caused by system state changes or unknown inputs. Therefore, it is 
necessary to build an indicator signal (residual) for fault detection. 
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System State Variable 
 
Fig. 4.8 CSTR state variables over time 
 
Simulation Results for the Observers 
Observer 1 
Fig. 4.9 shows that observer 1 has step change at t=300s (when reactor 
temperature sensor fault occurs) and has little ramp change since t=100s (when heat 
exchanger fouling begins). 
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Fig. 4.9 Observer 1 state variables over time 
Observer 2 
Fig. 4.10 shows that observer 2 responses at t = 100s (when heat exchanger 
fouling begins). 
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Fig. 4.10 Observer 2 state variables over time 
Fault Diagnosis 
Fig. 4.9 shows that the observer state may be affected by both system state and 
faults. We can not determine the presence of faults by observer states. It is necessary to 
check the residual signal, which is only sensitive to a specific fault at steady state. 
Residual works as an indicator of a specific fault. Fig. 4.11 shows that at t = 
300s, there is a big spike. This change is caused by the reactor temperature sensor fault. 
Sensor output signals are the input of observers. Step change in the sensor signal may 
cause instant large deviations of observer sates and residual at transient period can not be 
used to identify the size of fault. After a while, the residual comes back to steady state.  
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From Fig. 4.11 and Fig. 4.13, the new states of residuals are nonzero, which 
successfully indicate the presence of faults. That is to say, residual signals are enough 
for fault detection and isolation. But just from the residual signal, it is still difficult to 
evaluate the size of fault. From (3.33), we can estimate the value of fault based on the 
residual signal. Fig. 4.12 and Fig. 4.14 show that the estimated faults are around the real 
faults within an error band caused by sensor noises.   
Observer 1 
Fig. 4.11 Residual for reactor temperature sensor fault over time 
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Fig. 4.12 Estimated fault compared with real fault in reactor temperature sensor 
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Observer 2 
 
Fig. 4.13 Residual for heat exchanger fouling fault over time 
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Fig. 4.14 Estimated fault compared with real fault in heat exchanger 
So far, fault detection, isolation and identification have been achieved at the 
same time. By observing the simulation results, it is easy to immediately notice that 
unknown input diagnostic observer works well for fault diagnosis. 
4.3 Case 3: Dealing with Model Uncertainties 
In this case, an analytical instrument is used to measure the component 
concentration. The analytical sensor is more likely to have fault. In this case, another 
possible fault is in the heat exchanger. Also, model uncertainty of reaction activation 
energy is present in the model. This case is different from the previous two cases: first, a 
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model uncertainty exists in the reaction activation energy; second, the fault in the heat 
exchanger may be as high as 50% of the nominal value. Thus model mismatch increases 
in this case. In order to investigate the effect of model uncertainty on fault diagnosis, two 
alternative pairs of observers have been examined. The first pair was designed on the 
basis of the linearized system, as in the previous case study. The second pair considered 
(i) model uncertainty as an additive disturbance to the reaction rate and (ii) the overall 
heat exchange rate as fault.  
4.3.1 Introduction 
A non-isothermal continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR) is considered with 
coolant jacket dynamics, where the following exothermic irreversible reaction between 
sodium thiosulfate and hydrogen peroxide is taking place [53, 54]. 
4.3.2 Reactive System  
                                     
 A              B                  C                D              E 
(4.13) 
The reaction rate is: 
 
       
(
     
  )  
 
 (4.14) 
where d1 is the uncertainty of the reaction activation energy, and E is the nominal 
activation energy. 
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4.3.3 Modeling 
Model of CSTR 
The mass balance in the reactor is: 
 
  ̇  
 
 
(       )     (4.15) 
 
The heat balance in the reactor is: 
 
 ̇  
 
 
(     )    
(    )
   
 (
(    ) (    )
    
) (4.16) 
 
The heat balance in the cooling jacket is: 
 
  ̇  
  
  
(       )  (
(    ) (    )
       
) (4.17) 
The parameters are given in Table 4.3. The parameters are mainly from [54]. 
Modeling of Faults 
Two faults will be considered: 
 An additive fault    in the analytical sensor 
 An fault    in heat exchanger because of fouling 
Modeling of Disturbances 
One disturbance will be considered: 
 The reaction activation energy has an uncertainty    
The system output is: 
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]  [
     
 
  
] (4.18) 
The concentration of component A is assumed to be measured by an analytical sensor. 
Table 4.3: Process parameters of reaction sodium thiosulfate and hydrogen 
peroxide in CSTR 
Parameter Description Value Unit 
V Volume of the reactor 100 L 
k0 Frequency factor of Arrehenius form 6.85×10
11
L/(s·mol) 
Ea Activation energy 76534.704 J/mol 
∆H Enthalpy of reaction (exothermic) 596.619×103 J/mol 
ρ Density of the reacting mixture 1000 g/L 
Cp Heat capacity of the reacting mixture 4.2 J/(g·K) 
Fin Feed flow rate 1 L/s 
CAin Inlet feed concentration of component A 1 mol/L 
CBin Inlet feed concentration of component B 2 mol/L 
Tin Inlet feed temperature 278.15 K 
Vw Volume of the cooling jacket 30 L 
ρw Density of the reacting coolant 1000 g/L 
Cpw Heat capacity of the coolant 4.2 J/(g·K) 
U Overall heat transfer rate 500 w/(m
2
·K)
Å Overall heat transfer area 10 m
2
Twin Inlet coolant temperature 278.15 K 
Fwin Inlet coolant flow rate 10 L/s 
R Gas constant 8.3144621 J/(K·mol) 
  ,  ,    are state variables. At steady state: 
    =0.0555 mol/L 
  =343.1617 K 
    =285.0661 K 
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4.3.4 Observer Design 
There are two possible faults in the system, thus two observers are required. Each 
observer is to estimate one fault, and the effect of the other fault and disturbance are 
decoupled on the residual. But in order to deal with the model uncertainties, an 
alternative pair of observers was also considered and compared to the first pair of 
observers. 
Observer 1: Estimate Analytical Sensor Fault f1, and Consider f2 as Disturbance d2 
The objective of this observer is to estimate the possible fault in the analytical 
sensor. In order to decouple the effect of the other possible fault in the heat exchange 
coefficient caused by fouling in the heat exchanger, heat exchanger fault is considered to 
be disturbance. 
The model of CSTR is linearized at steady state (fault and disturbance are zero). 
The linearized system is as follows (3.7)-(3.8): 
  ̇                 
                  
 
where: 
 
  [
       
    
       
]                                                [           ]  
where: 
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Based on the linearized system, the unknown input diagnostic observer is as follows 
(3.15)-(3.16): 
  ̇            
             
Based on the observer, the estimated fault is as follows (3.33): 
   [     (       )     ]
     
According to section (3.3.3), set s=1, then: 
        [                     ]  
93 
 
 
  [
         
      
 
    
 
 
 
 
    
          
     
 
 
 
 
] [
 
  
 
     
]
 [                     ] 
 
   [   ]           
      
 
   [
    
    
 
      
]        [                    ]  
                      
         
Observer 2: Estimate Heat Exchanger Fault f2, and Consider f1 as Disturbance d2  
The objective of this observer is to estimate the possible fault in the heat 
exchanger. In order to decouple the effect of the other possible fault in the reactor 
temperature sensor, reactor temperature sensor fault is considered to be disturbance. 
The model of CSTR is linearized at steady state (f2, d are zero). The linearized 
system is as follows (3.7)-(3.8): 
  ̇                 
                  
 
where: 
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Based on the linearized system, the unknown input diagnostic observer is as follows 
(3.15)-(3.16): 
  ̇            
             
Based on the observer, the estimated fault is as follows (3.33): 
   [     (       )     ]
     
According to section (3.3.3), set s=1, then: 
        [                  ]  
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Observer 1’: Estimate Analytical Sensor Fault f1 
Observer 1’ considers reaction rate in the form of         
( 
 
  
)   
     
     . Where    is the total disturbance in the reaction rate term. And the entire term 
   (    ) is also considered as a disturbance   . In this way, the system nonlinearity 
is significantly decreased, and the system model becomes: 
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)  
The system output is: 
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The model of CSTR is linearized at steady state (f2, d are zero). The linearized system is 
as follows (3.7)-(3.8): 
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where: 
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Based on the linearized system, the unknown input diagnostic observer is as follows 
(3.15)-(3.16): 
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  ̇            
             
Based on the observer, the estimated fault is as follows (3.33): 
   [     (       )     ]
     
According to section (3.3.3), set s=1, then: 
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Observer 2’: Estimate Heat Exchanger Fault    by Estimating    (    ) 
Observer 2’ considers reaction rate in the form of         
( 
 
  
)   
     
     . Where    is the overall disturbance in the reaction rate term. And sensor fault    
is considered as disturbance   . This observer is to estimate the entire term    
   (    ). Because heat transfer area is known, and T,    can be measured,    is then 
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to be estimated. In this way, the system nonlinearity is significantly decreased, and the 
system model becomes: 
 
  ̇  
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The system output is: 
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]  
The model of CSTR is linearized at steady state (f2, d are zero). The linearized system is 
as follows (3.7)-(3.8): 
  ̇                 
                  
where: 
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Based on the linearized system, the unknown input diagnostic observer is as follows 
(3.15)-(3.16): 
  ̇            
             
Based on the observer, the estimated fault is as follows (3.33): 
   [     (       )     ]
     
According to section (3.3.3), set s=1, then: 
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4.3.5 Simulation 
The system model (4.15)-(4.18) and observers are simulated by MATLAB. The 
initial state of the system is fault free. White noises with normal distribution have been 
added to the temperature sensor. One step fault in the temperature sensor and one ramp 
fault in heat exchanger occur at different times. The initial state of the observers is zero. 
The eigenvalues of observers are set negative making sure the observers are stable. 
Simulation Conditions for the Reactor 
Initial Conditions 
 
[
   
  
   
]  [
      
        
        
]  
Noise 
Normally distributed random noises with zero mean and standard deviation 0.1 
(and 0.001) were simulated with the MATLAB function “randn” and were added to the 
simulated values of   and    (and   ). 
Faults 
        (it occurs at t=300s) 
           (it occurs at t=100s and increases continuously. f2 is linear to 
time. At t=5000s, f2=0.1U) 
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Disturbance 
Set the reaction activation energy uncertainty as 10% of the nominal value: 
d1=∆E= -0.1E 
Time 
 Initial Time:         
 Final Time:            
Observer Part 
Initial Conditions 
 Observer 1:      
 Observer 2:      
 Observer 1’:      
 Observer 2’:      
Eigenvalues 
Based on the eigenvalues of linearized systems, observer eigenvalues are selected 
faster than the linearized system but slower than ten times the speed of the linearized 
system. 
Linearized System 1:  eig = {-0.0256, -0.2418, -0.3732}; 
Linearized System 2:  eig = {-0.0256, -0.2418, -0.3732};   
Linearized System 1’: eig = {-0.0100, -0.0206, -0.3744};   
Linearized System 2’: eig=  {-0.0100, -0.0206, -0.3744};   
Observer 1: eig = -0.1406 
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Observer 2: eig = -0.1406 
Observer 1’:eig = -0.0550 
Observer 2’:eig = -0.0550 
4.3.6 Simulation Result and Discussion 
Similar to previous cases, the system model and observers were simulated. The 
simulation results are described in the following subsections. In order to better evaluate 
the performance of the unknown input diagnostic observer, states of system and 
observers along with residual signals and estimated faults are plotted. 
System Results for the Reactor 
The CSTR system starts at points near steady state. Fig. 4.15 shows that at time 
t=300s and t=100s, there is a step change in reactor temperature and a ramp change in 
cooling jacket, respectively. But we still can not determine that the signal changes from 
the measurements are caused by system state changes or unknown inputs. Therefore, it is 
necessary to build an indicator signal (residual) for fault detection. 
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System State Variable 
 
Fig. 4.15 CSTR state variables over time 
 
Simulation Results for the Observers 
Observer 1 
Fig. 4.16 shows that observer 1 has step change at t=300s (when reactor 
temperature sensor fault occurs). 
Fig. 4.17 shows that observer 2 has obvious ramp change at t=100s. 
Fig. 4.18 is the same as Fig. 4.16, and Fig. 4.19 is similar to Fig. 4.17.  
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Fig. 4.16 Observer 1 state variables over time 
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Observer 2 
 
Fig. 4.17 Observer 2 state variables over time 
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Observer 1’ 
 
Fig. 4.18 Observer 1’ state variables over time 
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Observer 2’ 
 
Fig. 4.19 Observer 2’ state variables over time 
 
Fault Diagnosis 
Residual works as an indicator of a specific fault. From Fig. 4.20 and Fig. 4.22 
(Fig. 4.24 is similar to Fig. 4.20, and Fig. 4.26 is similar to Fig. 4.22), the new states of 
residuals are nonzero, which successfully indicate the presence of faults. That is to say, 
residual signals are enough for fault detection and isolation. But just from the residual 
signal, it is still difficult to evaluate the size of fault. From (3.33), we can estimate the 
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value of fault based on the residual signal. Fig. 4.21 and Fig. 4.25 show that the 
estimated faults are around the real faults within an error caused by sensor noises. But 
for Fig. 4.23, there is a big error for the estimation of the fault in heat exchange 
coefficient because of linearization erorors. However, observer 2’ accurately estimates 
the fault in heat exchange coefficient by decreasing the nonlinearity of the model. 
 
Observer 1 
 
Fig. 4.20 Residual for analytical sensor fault over time 
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Fig. 4.21 Estimated fault compared with real fault in reactor analytical sensor 
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Observer 2 
 
Fig. 4.22 Residual for heat exchanger fouling fault over time 
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Fig. 4.23 Estimated fault compared with real fault in heat exchanger 
 
Because of linearization errors caused by nonlinearity, the estimated fouling fault 
in the heat exchanger has large errors. Thus a better observer and residual for fouling 
fault diagnosis is desired. 
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Observer 1’ 
 
Fig. 4.24 Residual for analytical sensor fault over time 
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Fig. 4.25 Estimated fault compared with real fault in reactor analytical sensor 
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Observer 2’ 
 
Fig. 4.26 Residual for heat exchanger fouling fault over time 
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Fig. 4.27 Estimated fault compared with real fault in heat exchanger 
 
From the figures above, we can notice that if a fault or disturbance occurs in the 
high nonlinearity term in the system model, it is better to consider the whole nonlinear 
part as fault or disturbance. In this way, the linearization errors can be reduced, and the 
fault estimation would be more accurate. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
The major focuses of this thesis is on unknown input diagnostic observer for 
exothermic CSTR systems. The objectives of the thesis have been stated in the first 
chapter. In order to achieve these objectives, the method of unknown input diagnostic 
observer has been reviewed. The performance of this approach was illustrated by 
representative applications to exothermic CSTR cases.  
The first objective of the thesis is to find a proper diagnostic technique which can 
be used in chemical process systems and in particular exothermic CSTRs. To achieve 
this objective, many papers and books have been studied and three categories of fault 
diagnosis approaches have been reviewed. These approaches include multivariate 
statistical process monitoring, analytical model-based method and knowledge-based 
approach. Considering that a first principle model is often available for CSTRs, 
observer-based method was selected in this thesis. In order to decouple the effects of 
disturbances and isolate and identify the faults, the unknown input diagnostic observer 
(UIDO) was selected for application. The derivation of UIDO was reviewed and a new 
simple derivation of parts of the Luenberger conditions has been proposed. The UIDO 
design procedures were presented. A general MATLAB program for UIDO design was 
developed in this thesis. 
The second objective of this thesis is to apply the method selected to exothermic 
CSTR systems. In order to achieve this goal, the CSTR system is modeled with possible 
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faults and disturbances. Then the CSTR model was linearized at steady state. UIDO was 
designed based on the linearized model. To better evaluate applicability to real 
processes, noises were added to the sensor outputs and the observer was tested on the 
nonlinear system instead of the linearized system. After extensive simulations on the 
case studies, we conclude that:       
 Unknown input diagnostic observe works well on exothermic CSTRs for 
fault detection, isolation and identification. 
 Unknown input diagnostic observe also works on nonlinear system with 
relatively small model uncertainties. 
 MATLAB program for UIDO design works efficiently and effectively. 
5.2 Future Directions 
Even though the unknown input diagnostic observer works well on exothermic 
CSTR systems, there is still a room for further improvements. A few possible directions 
are outlined as follows: 
 The linear UIDO works well on the exothermic CSTR systems. But these 
systems in this thesis are simple and mildly nonlinear. For chemical 
processes, most systems are highly nonlinear with complex dynamics. 
Nonlinear unknown input diagnostic observer is one of the directions.  
 The design of nonlinear unknown input diagnostic observers requires 
deep mathematical knowledge even for small scale systems. Even if this 
objective can be achieved in the future, first principle models of chemical 
processes are not always available or may be difficult to obtain, in which 
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case, UIDO would not be applicable. In order to overcome this limitation, 
multivariate statistical process monitoring methods can be investigated 
for large and complex systems. 
 Multivariate statistical process monitoring methods can be used in 
complex chemical processes. However, the data obtained from processes 
provides limited information and fault diagnosis results are not as reliable 
as the UIDO method. What’s worse, statistical-based method requires 
process data in the presence of faults for faults isolation. This data are 
always unavailable or difficult and expensive to obtain. An alternative 
method is neural network fault diagnosis. This method is considered as a 
middle method between UIDO method and statistical-based method. But 
neural network method may need long training time.  
Currently, no method is absolutely perfect for fault diagnosis. Diverse methods 
need to be studied under various circumstances.  
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